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Ever since Robert Conquest’s pioneering study of Joseph Stalin’s Soviet Union 
first appeared in 1968, the high point of state-sponsored violence in the 1930s 
has been commonly referred to as the “Great Terror”. The subsequent adoption 
of the eponymous title by scholars to describe the broader phenomenon of “state 
terror” in the Stalinist period is similarly now widespread within the field. This 
terminology is, however, highly problematic. In the language and ideology of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) terror was consistently portrayed 
as a threat to, rather than strategy of, the state. It formed part of a tightly con-
trolled terminology of terror, rooted in the Party’s experiences of revolution and 
civil war, and employed by the regime to marginalize and condemn opponents 
in official propaganda and private discourse. This study will address this key dis-
tinction and illuminate an important element of continuity in the tactics, ideol-
ogy and self-perception of the CPSU, and its satellite parties within the Commu-
nist International, when approaching challenges to their authority (both real and 
imagined), whether they were of a social, political or even international flavour. 
Deploying a case study approach, this paper will demonstrate the extent to which 
“terror” and other related language offered a stable characterisation of the “en-
emy” throughout the interwar period. 
Keywords: terror; Stalinism; press; propaganda; Communist International; his-
toriography. 
В 1968 г. Роберт Конквест впервые опубликовал новаторское исследование 
политической ситуации в Советском Союзе в период правления Иосифа 
Сталина. С этого момента пик государственного насилия 1930-х гг. стали 
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называть «Большим террором». В последующем термин получил широкое 
распространение в научных кругах в связи с его использованием для 
описания более общего феномена государственного террора в сталинский 
период. Однако это определение представляется весьма проблемным. 
В языковых практиках и идеологии КПСС понятие «террор» использовали 
скорее для обозначения опасного для государства явления, чем для 
описания государственной политики. Все это сформировало, по крайней 
мере частично, жестко контролируемую терминологию, связанную 
с террором, берущую начало в том опыте, который партия получила в эпоху 
революции и Гражданской войны. Терминология террора использовалась 
режимом для маргинализации и осуждения оппонентов в официальной 
пропаганде и в частном дискурсе. Настоящее исследование затрагивает 
ключевую проблему различия в представлениях о направленности террора 
(от государства или против государства). Особое внимание уделяется связям 
и преемственности между тактикой, идеологией и самовосприятием КПСС 
и входившими в Коминтерн партиями-сателлитами в условиях реальных 
и мнимых социальных, политических и даже международных вызовов их 
господству. Исследование осуществлено с использованием методов case 
study с целью показать степень, до которой «террор» и связанные с ним 
понятия формируют типичные характеристики «врага» в межвоенный 
период.
Ключевые слова: террор; сталинизм; пресса; пропаганда; Коммунистический 
интернационал; историография. 
The leaders of the Bolshevik revolution undertook a complete reordering 
of society – and the very make-up of the world stage – embracing violence, 
the oppression of personal enemies, and those of their fledgling regime, as 
necessary components of change. Yet it was not just during revolution and 
civil war that the coercive spread of Soviet power across nations was justified; 
throughout the opening decades of the Party’s struggle to build a commu-
nist utopia, when tasked with the problem of the Soviet people, here too the 
sword of the proletarian dictatorship fell with self-righteous fury.
A sense of personal justification does not, however, discount the need 
for pragmatism. The persecution of political rivals; the forced exile of entire 
peoples; and the arbitrary arrest, imprisonment and execution of count-
less undesirable elements were all, by and large, completed without fanfare 
and away from public scrutiny. The regime acted with an acute concern for 
the control and censorship of information, of absolute secrecy typical of its 
entire modus operandi. This was a fundamental tenet of the Soviet coercive 
machinery, one acknowledged by those who suffered at its hands and later 
became among its most prominent critics [Solzhenitsyn, p. 11].
Yet even on the more public stage of show trials, the moral, judicial and 
ideological condemnation of their enemies – enemies of the people – was con-
trolled, scripted and directed to reinforce the paternal role of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in protecting its subjects from any threats 
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to life, liberty and the promised land of Soviet plenty [Chase]. In this manner, 
the Bolsheviks aimed to limit the risk of equally moralistic condemnation 
being levelled against them, which, in turn, might lead to the destabilisation 
of a society with well-established revolutionary credentials. 
Putting aside for the moment the question of whether such a strategy 
was at all successful in concealing the reality from audiences at home and 
abroad, it is enough to acknowledge that these methods and the wider me-
chanics of state repression still continue to impede efforts to fully under-
stand the true extent of the regime’s victims and the impact of its coercive 
force on society. Still, a central though often overlooked point remains. The 
language and terminology of terror and repression, of mass arrests and 
the violent subjugation of peoples, of despotic governments and bloody 
executioners, was a vocabulary monopolised by the Party and employed 
against its opponents. Indeed, the routine deployment of this language 
throughout the interwar period reveals that Joseph Stalin and his ruling 
circle approached challenges to their authority (both real and imagined) 
in much the same way, whether they were problems of a social, political or 
even international flavour. As a result, this paper will demonstrate how the 
public denunciation of enemies (be it individual, group, or nation) formed 
a key component of Soviet coercive control. Additionally, that the par-
ticular language used to characterise enemies and their activities has been 
overlooked by scholars, despite the breadth, depth and volume of research 
into the topic completed in the intervening years warrants attention, 
if not a critical assessment of why historians’ persistent reliance on “terror” 
as a shorthand for the Soviet Union’s own repressive activities has contrib-
uted to the obfuscation of this contemporary reality.
This fundamental strategy, the language it codified and the machinery 
responsible for its communication extended beyond Soviet borders and 
reflects the coordinated efforts of international communists loyal to Mos-
cow to condemn its enemies and vilify any and all acts of violence – or the 
potential there of – against its allies among the world’s proletariat and fra-
ternal parties of the Third International. The significance of such a victim 
complex becomes doubly important when placed in the context of Joseph 
Stalin’s own preoccupation with external threats to the security of the So-
viet state, and how this links to the highpoints of state repression witnessed 
throughout his primacy [Shearer, 2018]. Without taking seriously both the 
fear of enemies and their public presentation over the long term, histori-
ans are in danger of continuing to overlook patterns of violence that help 
illuminate key methods, mechanics and motivations of state repression 
in Stalin’s Soviet Union.
Terror, Repression and Violent Rhetoric
This present study was originally developed from earlier research into 
the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939–1940. The strategies employed, and the 
language used by the CPSU to describe these events in official propagan-
da show a striking degree of continuity with the preceding years of Soviet 
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dominance. A particularly arresting aspect to emerge from this work was 
Moscow’s desperate attempt to justify Soviet intervention in Finland by 
propagating the idea that “terror” and “repression” could be used against 
the Finnish people by the Helsinki government:
Young Finnish workers have always been a friend of the Soviet Union. 
No police ban, no savage repression (nikakie svirepye repressii), no terror (nika-
koi terror) will be able to destroy the hearts of the Finnish youth or their love 
of the great socialist country...
The above quote is taken from a published letter credited to a young 
Finnish worker and “friend of the Soviet people”, which appeared in Kom-
somolskaya Pravda – the official organ of the Communist Union of Youth 
(Komsomol) – shortly before the outbreak of hostilities between the USSR 
and Finland in November 1939 [Комсомольская правда, 1939, 24 нояб., 
с. 4]. The letter signalled the beginning of a concerted effort by the Soviet 
press to distinguish between the people and the political administration 
of Finland, which would later be integral to a carefully engineered image 
of a polarised Finnish society, perpetuated throughout the war. What 
is most striking, however, is the assumed persecution this young Finn an-
ticipated from his own government in response to such a public display 
of support for the USSR. Indeed, whether the author of this letter was ac-
tually Finnish is irrelevant. Rather, one should see its publication as a de-
monstrative example of the Party’s repeated publicising of the use of ter-
ror by rival regimes against their own people in the 1920s and 30s, ensuring 
the routine deployment of this language would once again appear during 
the eventual conflict with Moscow’s neighbours to the north [Spencer, 2018].
Building on this research, one of the central aims of this paper is to 
move scholarly discussion away from a misunderstanding and misapplica-
tion of the term “terror” more broadly. The longstanding deployment of this 
shorthand to describe the actions – and by implication, motivation – of the 
Soviet state is a flawed. While it is not my intention to diminish the terrible 
nature of the crimes for which the Soviet regime was responsible, in seek-
ing to properly understand both the way the regime operated and judge 
the impact of its actions on society, a soberer reflection on events from the 
perspective of the Party is necessary, as is a more systematic reflection on 
the output of its press and propaganda machinery throughout the interwar 
period. This will be achieved by focusing on three key case studies – the 
short lived “Red Terror” campaign witnessed during the Civil War period; 
the 1927 war scare; and the Moscow Show Trials of 1936–1938 – outlining 
trends in the presentation of enemies and the explicit language used in of-
ficial publications intended for public consumption domestically and in-
ternationally. These case studies are not intended to provide an exhaustive 
account of prominent episodes in Soviet history. Instead, the chronological 
parameters of each episode will provide a window of focus for assessing 
to which enemies and with what language the regime sought to draw the 
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attention of the readers of the central and regional Soviet press. As will be 
seen, this often extended beyond the key protagonists at the centre of these 
events, and instead sought to shine a light on widespread cases of injustice 
and injury suffered by communists and their allies beyond Soviet borders.
The Great Terror
First, one must acknowledge that the source of any disparity between his-
toriographical and contemporaneous uses of the term “terror” can be largely 
credited to success of Robert Conquest’s, The Great Terror. Ever since Con-
quest’s pioneering study of Stalin’s Soviet Union first appeared in 1968, the 
high point of state-sponsored violence witnessed in the region during the 
1930s has been commonly referred to as the “Great Terror”.1 The adoption 
of the eponymous title by subsequent scholars to describe the broader phe-
nomenon of “state terror” in the period was not, however, a development 
envisioned by the author, who originally opted to define the high point 
of repressions in the 1930s as the “Great Purge”. This is a distinct but no less 
problematic nomenclature given the potential overlap with the non-violent, 
merely politically punitive process involved in regular “purges” (chistki) 
of the party membership that took place. These periodic culls were a bureau-
cratic necessity for the CPSU to limit the proliferation of careerists, encour-
age a degree of dynamism and maintain strict discipline within its ranks [Ser-
vice, 2003, p. 215]. Obviously, they could be – and were – exploited by Stalin 
to ensure a strengthening of his support base and the removal of opposition 
elements, but they did not immediately go hand in hand with arrest and ex-
ecution.2 Nevertheless, reflecting on Conquest’s work, James Harris writes: 
“It has been almost continuously in print for nearly forty-five years, having 
shaped – perhaps ‘fixed’ is a better word – the popular image of political vio-
lence under Stalin” [The Anatomy of Terror, p. 2]. 
Notwithstanding this apparent consensus, the accuracy of such a popu-
lar image and the use of the term “terror” to describe the activity and mo-
tivations of the Soviet regime has still produced debate among specialists. 
Arch Getty admits that the Great Terror is “another inexact shorthand for 
the disparate events of that decade”, though, like most others, falls back 
on “terror” as the term of choice [Getty, Naumov, 1999, p. 492]. Similar-
ly, Sarah Davies and James Harris have more recently acknowledged the 
“controversy” surrounding use of “‘Terror’ or ‘Great Terror’ as a label for 
the political violence of 1936–1938” in the footnotes of their study, while 
continuing to deploy the term on the justification that it shares sufficient 
1 Originally published as Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: Stalin’s Purge of the Thirties 
[Conquest, 1968]. This study will hereafter reference an edition updated after the opening of 
archival access following the collapse of the Soviet Union [Conquest, 2008].
2 For an insight into party purges at the regional level and the less violent outcome 
the process could have for members whose party cards were withdrawn, see: [Kang-Bohr]. 
Note, too, how the language of “terror” permeated the commentary of both Stalin and the 
Moscow leadership in their assessment of the threat of enemy activity, of these so called 
“anti-Soviet terror organisations”.
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parallels with the similarly named phase of the French Revolution [Davies, 
Harris, p. 287].
One of the few scholars that explicitly avoids this terminology is David 
Shearer, who aptly describes the potential obfuscation of historical reality 
caused by this historiographical framing:
…it is a misnomer to call the mass purges that swept the Soviet Union in the 
late 1930s the Great Terror… The distinction is important for historical reasons 
of understanding motives and origins: how leaders and ordinary people under-
stood what was happening and what they were doing or experiencing. Leaders 
and police officials understood of the mass operations as a cleansing, a literal 
purge of the body politic. They did not regard what they were doing as terror, 
which was the term Lenin and the Bolsheviks used, unapologetically, during 
the revolutionary wars of 1918–1924 [Shearer, 2009, p. 286]. 
Unfortunately, by now, the close association between “terror” and the 
Soviet Union extends to non-Soviet specialists and remains a prominent 
preoccupation within studies of the region’s past and the key features 
of Stalinism. There are still, of course, exceptions. For example, Ian Ker-
shaw’s bold assertion of “terror” operating as the “defining characteristic 
of Stalin’s regime” stands in a stark contrast to the most recent scholarship 
from Jon Waterlow concerned with popular experiences of life (and hu-
mour) in the Soviet Union at the height of the mass repressions [Kershaw, 
p. 274; Waterlow, p. 11–12].
And yet, the continued and widespread use of terror as an accepted 
shorthand within historical scholarship on the Soviet Union remains high-
ly problematic. Thus, regardless of any conscious recognition by histori-
ans of the controversy surrounding the term, there is an evident reluctance 
to move away from the traditional deployment of terror to describe the 
punitive actions of the Soviet regime, ultimately suggesting that an uncon-
scious bias might be at play [Kahneman, p. 276–277; Spencer, 2020].
Conversely, until only recently has there been an attempt to understand 
early manifestations of “red terror” from the perspective of the Bolsheviks 
in the specific context of their formative experience of revolution and civil 
war, and as singled out by Shearer above. That is, to observe the measured 
justification of state violence in the ideology of Marxism-Leninism, pursu-
ing a close study of the language employed by the leadership in its defence 
in the opening years of Bolshevik power [Ryan, 2012; Ryan, 2015]. Such 
an adjustment still requires the recognition that this justification extended 
to the party faithful alone. The regime was not oblivious to the need to de-
fend against the prospect of opponents marshalling their own moral con-
demnation of the Soviet state. Thus, to understand the shift that took place 
after the solidification of Soviet control, a long-term view is vital to under-
standing developments in the 1920s and 1930s. Such an approach will allow 
this paper to trace the regime’s growing concern with the censorship and 
subsequent monopolisation of any language related to violent expressions 
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of state power. The regime’s distinct vocabulary was an essential tool in the 
way the Party practiced power and communicated in public and private. 
It is time, therefore, for historians to “speak Bolshevik” – to adopt the 
terms and conceptions of the time – and to understand the Party’s contem-
porary perspective on the violence and subjugation of millions of its own 
citizens during its existence. In the first instance, “terror” must be identi-
fied as a term publicly and privately employed by the Party to vilify its op-
ponents: “Fascist Terror in Spain”, “Terror against the Communist Party in 
France”, “Terror by Mannerheim’s Gangs”.3 Stalin and his inner circle were 
the victims or witnesses of “terror”, never the perpetrators of it. So confi-
dent were they in the stable meaning of the term as a label for the “enemy” 
that the regime’s repeated use of this expression in 1939–1940 – alongside 
other violent language associated with it – was even perceived as a suitable 
strategy for selling the advance of Soviet forces across central and eastern 
Europe to their own people and audiences abroad.
Case Study 1: The Red Terror
During the “Red Terror” of 1918, a very public campaign of state-
sponsored violence was initially deemed to serve the Bolsheviks’ aims. 
As a result, the leadership were sluggish to realise the negative impact such 
a strategy could have on their public standing and the security of the fledg-
ling republic. Though the Central Committee eventually condemned the 
excessively violent and unrestrained calls for retribution seen from some 
within its membership during this punitive campaign, it was not enough 
to affect an immediate change [Acton, Stableford, p. 120–122]. In general, 
it took time for the Party to appreciate the need to distance itself from the 
extreme and arbitrary enforcement of revolutionary rule by its secret police 
force, the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission, or Cheka. Again, this is 
to stress the shift in the presentation of terror, when there was never any 
discernible difference between the attitudes of both Vladimir Lenin and Jo-
seph Stalin to the opening of “mass systematic terror against the bourgeoi-
sie and its agents” in this early period of Soviet rule [Service, 1995, p. 39]. 
From its initial temporary status, the Cheka’s role in the new Bolshevik 
state was quickly established, as was a parallel concern among the leader-
ship for censorship and managing public perceptions of its activity. Accord-
ing to James Ryan, the Cheka’s “continued existence was assured for the rest 
of the Civil War, and the party’s Central Committee resolved in December 
[1918] that there should be no place for ‘malicious criticism’ of the state’s 
organizations in the press” [Ryan, 2015, p. 16]. Lazar Kaganovich, who later 
occupied a prominent role within Stalin’s inner circle, distinguished him-
self in the Civil War and was a willing participant in the Red Terror in his 
3 These examples are taken from article headings that appeared in central and regional 
newspapers in 1939. The stories were drawn from Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union 
(TASS) bulletins gathered from foreign press sources and generally appeared in most news-
papers on concurrent days. See, for example: Pravda and Leningradskaya Pravda (Spain) 
29 July and 21 August; (France) 18 October; (Finland) 22 December 1939. 
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provincial capacity in Nizhny Novgorod. He provides an excellent example 
of a Bolshevik who understood the need to distinguish between policy and 
publicity, encouraging a careful separation of the Party from its punitive 
agents, and a censoring of their coercive activity in the press. As Arfon Rees 
points out, “with startling frankness [Kaganovich] stressed the party’s role 
was to lead, but not overtly. The party should secretly instruct the Cheka 
or the Military Tribunal to carry out arrests and executions but should not 
directly involve itself in these matters”. Kaganovich is quoted as insisting: 
“nobody must know about this; you will not see in the press accusations 
from the province committee of the party” [Rees, 2012, p. 24–25]. 
Early efforts to instil this attitude across the Party included both the public 
criticism of its members’ explicit calls for bloody retribution, alongside more 
devious efforts to transfer blame for the violence onto rival groups caught up 
in the fighting. The impetus for this came from the very top, with Lenin an en-
thusiastic proponent of the employment of such underhand tactics to deflect 
blame for Bolshevik atrocities onto their enemies [Service, 1995, p. 42]. It was 
not, however, a universally adopted approach within the Party. Leon Trot-
sky – that self-confident and self-promoting ideologist – was among the most 
enthusiastic of Bolsheviks to defend the tactic of state-sponsored terror as a 
justifiable necessity in the context of war and revolution [Ryan, 2012, p. 146].
Far more consistent was the leadership’s control of the central party 
press and the careful avoidance of overt reference to the Bolshevik’s own 
coercive activity in the pages of Pravda. The figures are in fact striking. 
In the immediate aftermath of the assassination of the leader of the Petro-
grad Cheka, Moisei Uritsky, and the subsequent attempt on Lenin’s life 
in August 1918, not a single reference to “red terror” is recorded in the 
pages of this key publication. The pattern continues for the rest of the year, 
and it is not until 1919 that the first use of the term appears in Pravda.4
The specific reference in this case is to events in Germany, and the 
“unfortunate” use of “red terror” in the face of the bourgeoisie’s initiation 
of civil war and first application of “the techniques of terror – white ter-
ror” [Правда, 1919, 19 янв., с. 1]. This attempt to justify terror in the face 
of enemy atrocities is not unique, nor is the tactic of drawing attention to 
events outside Russian borders. On 7 May 1921, Pravda sought to shine 
a light on the revolutionary struggle in Czechoslovakia. Reference was 
made to the decision of farm labourers to deploy red terror only in the face 
of white [Правда, 1921, 7 мая, с. 1].5 The specific details provided are 
4 In total there are just 32 recorded cases of ‘red terror’ (krasnii terror) in Pravda for the 
years chosen for this study (1 January 1917 – 31 December 1940). The East View database 
allows for a keyword search of all editions within this span, and while there are instances 
among these early copies where the reproduction of the digital text is imperfectly rendered 
due to poor quality of the original newspaper (or scan thereof), the general trend is evident. 
This figure also stands in stark contrast to the 4 592 cases where the more general term ‘ter-
ror’ (terror) is recorded within the database across the same period.
5 Here and elsewhere further links to the newspaper Pravda will be given according 
to the holdings of the electronic archive: [East View Information Services. Pravda Digital 
Archive (DA-PRA)].
M. L. G. Spencer                              Explaining Terror in Soviet Terms 751
scarce, but a pattern was already emerging of concentrating the reader’s at-
tention on violence abroad against any and all potential allies of the Soviet 
people, while offering scant coverage to the regime’s own repressive activi-
ties. By July 1922, a further strategy of seeking to outright dismiss reports 
of “red terror” and an “imaginary rebellion” against Soviet power in Geor-
gia anticipates the international communist press’ repeated willingness 
to accuse its counterparts among the bourgeois press of perpetuating nothing 
but lies and fabrications about Soviet affairs [Правда, 1922, 5 июля, с. 5].
“Terror’s useless, whatever its colour”6
Behind the scenes, and among the party leadership, the preference for 
self-censorship over self-justification appears to have won out. These sen-
timents even took root within the Cheka, and continued with its succes-
sor, the OGPU. Felix Dzerzhinskii headed both organisations during this 
important transition. Writing in the middle of the 1920s, he admonished 
those who failed to recognise the value in drawing a line between sanc-
tioned policy and public presentation in the battle for the countryside:
We see that, despite the repressions and the noise in the newspapers, the 
number of murders is increasing. In my opinion, the newspaper hype is unnec-
essary...Repressions are necessary, but neither they, nor the murders themselves 
need to be publicised.7
It was not Bolshevik foresight alone that facilitated this reorientation. 
Before the Civil War was won, the unleashing of the White’s own terror 
campaign on the hapless population had only served to aid the Bolshe-
vik position. The intervention of foreign powers on the White’s behalf fur-
ther served to alienate their disparate armies from the local population 
and allowed the Bolsheviks to consider their counter-revolutionary forces 
as a network of enemies serving the interests of powers abroad. 
The Whites, like the Reds, saw the counter-productive nature of terror 
tactics on their hopes of ingratiating themselves to the general populace 
[Acton, Stableford, p. 130–131]. However, they did not share the same uni-
formity of purpose and message employed by the Bolsheviks, or the mo-
nopoly on public channels of communication and transport between the 
major urban centres under Red Army control. The term “red terror” largely 
disappeared from party discourse and the press; the “white guards” and 
their terrorising of the Soviet people never did.
6 This rather apt quotation is taken from Mikhail Bulgakov’s, The Heart of a Dog [Bul-
gakov, p. 20].
7 ‘Letter to the Politburo about terror against village correspondents’ (15 February 1925) 
[РГАСПИ. Ф. 76. Оп. 3. Д. 294; Архив Александра Н. Яковлева]. These comments stand 
in direct contrast to those made by Dzerzhinskii in 1920, regarding the deployment of vio-
lence: ‘When we approach an enemy, to kill him, we kill him not because he’s an evil person, 
but because we make use of the instrument of terror in order to create fear for others’ [Ryan, 
2015, p. 1].
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Case Study 2: 1927 War Scare
During the crisis of 1927, when relations between Britain and the Soviet 
Union were at breaking point and the struggle for primacy in the Party 
raged on, the press whipped up the fear of foreign intervention and plots to 
murder Nikolai Bukharin, Alexei Rykov and Joseph Stalin: “Is this the terror 
of which the White Guard newspapers now speak of so often?” [Правда, 
1927, 9 июня; Brooks, p. 40]. This essential continuity in the presentation 
of terror as the exclusive preserve of the regime’s enemies has important 
implications for how we understand the further escalation of state-violence 
in the 1930s. The press routinely launched campaigns calling for “vigilance 
and ruthlessness towards the hidden enemy” throughout Stalin’s primacy 
[Conquest, 2008, p. 45]. Nor was the fear of foreign intervention unique to 
the 1930s; this fear had an enduring impact on the Bolshevik worldview 
from the revolutionary birth of the Soviet state and its formative experi-
ences of civil war. Indeed, the longstanding threat of enemies within and 
without is encapsulated in this perpetual struggle against “White Guards” 
and the experiences of those immediate post-revolutionary years. 
Turning to Pravda, we find numerous examples of the kind of familiar 
language being closely associated with the activity of enemies at home and 
abroad from May 1927 onwards.8 While events in Britain were still unfold-
ing, the same terminology of “white terror” can be found deployed within 
a report from Romania on the disposal of unitary trade unions published 
on 13 May [Правда, 1927, 13 мая, с. 2]. Similarly, alongside the restrained 
heading attached to reports of the English government’s discussion of the 
question of the USSR on 24 May, the editors opted to include reports of the 
“great success” of communists in recent Polish elections, as workers turned 
away from the Polish Socialist Party, even in the face of “unprecedented 
terror” (neslikhannii terror) [Правда, 1927, 24 мая, с. 2].
Far more illustrative of the regime’s increasing willingness to publicly link 
enemy activity abroad with the threat of intervention within Soviet borders 
followed news of the assassination of the Soviet diplomat, Pyotr Voykov, by 
a White Russian monarchist in Warsaw on 7 June. Eventually drawn into a 
conspiracy feeding on both the rupture with Britain earlier in the summer 
and the fresh souring of relations with Poland, Pravda opened its edition on 
9 July with a banner heading imploring readers to be on the alert :
Following the Anglo-Soviet split – the murder of comrade Voykov.
Following the Warsaw murder – flashes of white-guard terror near Minsk 
and Leningrad.
Comrades! Be on the alert! [Form] denser ranks around the VKP(b)!
[Правда, 1927, 9 июля, с. 1].
8 The chronological parameters of the keyword search for “terror” in this case were taken 
from 12 May 1927 – coinciding with the British police raid of the headquarters of the Soviet 
trade delegation and the All Russian Co-operative Society (ARCOS) in London – to the 
end of the same year (31 December 1927). In total, 264 matches for “terror” were returned.
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After Moscow’s subsequent break from negotiations with Warsaw to-
wards a new non-aggression treaty, the Poles were firmly back in the en-
emy camp. The year would close with claims of “White Terror in Poland”, 
attached to two brief dispatches from TASS in Warsaw, collected on page 
two under this provocative heading [Правда, 1927, 31 дек., с. 2]. The for-
mat would become a familiar sight for readers through the coming dec-
ade. Of course, the target of Soviet ire need not be a prominent protagonist 
in current diplomatic wrangles, as news of a “new wave of terror” in Italy 
in August 1927 reveals [Правда, 1927, 5 авг., с. 1]. 
Even if we allow for some variation between this earlier period and 1936–
1938 in the presentation of the criminal element to the public – as the hap-
less victims of state repression and the crimes for which they were explicitly 
accused were adapted to the priorities of the Party and labels of the day – the 
Civil War was clearly decisive in establishing a well-developed terminology 
of terror. The subsequent recycling of this language in the propaganda of the 
Party remains an overlooked facet of continuity in how the regime present-
ed terror and any opposition to the public, thus seeking to manage popular 
perceptions of its own violent and repressive tactics. It is, therefore, essential 
that we continue to follow this thread through to the 1930s.
Case Study 3: The Moscow Show Trials
Throughout the next decade, Joseph Stalin insisted upon a continuation 
of a similar black and white, bipolar worldview, while embracing the need 
for proper stage-management. All information was an invaluable, poten-
tially volatile, commodity; it had to be carefully controlled before any sanc-
tioned view of domestic and international events (and the official response 
they might elicit) could be disseminated.9
Stalin’s ultimate goal was to perpetuate the same degree of universalism the 
earlier Civil War language aspired to when portraying the actions of enemies 
and the events leading up to the Moscow Show Trails. He was not interested 
in the men involved or a simplistic tale of good versus evil. This was a struggle 
of opposing ideals not individuals. His venomous chastisement of Pravda in 
correspondence with Lazar Kaganovich and Vyacheslav Molotov in the au-
tumn of 1936 captures the sense of urgency with which Stalin expected this 
portrayal of the “Zinovievites and Trotskyites” to be universally applied:
Pravda failed to produce a single article that provided a Marxist explanation 
of the process of degradation of these scum, their sociopolitical complexion, and 
their real platform. It reduced everything to the personal element, to the notion 
that there are evil people who want to seize power and there are good people who 
hold power, and fed this paltry mush to the public…As far back as the X party 
congress, Lenin said that if a faction or factions persist in their errors in their 
9 For example, the reaction of the OGPU’s successors, the NKVD, to the assassination 
Leningrad party leader, Sergei Kirov, in December 1934 prioritised the immediate control 
of all information about the murderer and a blanket ban on passing details to government 
institutions and the press, “especially reporters from foreign newspapers” [Lenoe, p. 273].
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struggle against the party, under the Soviet system they will, without fail, slide 
down to the level of White Guardism, the defense of capitalism, a struggle against 
the Soviets, and must, without fail, merge with the enemies of Soviet rule. This 
proposition by Lenin has now been brilliantly confirmed. But Pravda, unfortu-
nately, failed to make use of it [Davies, Khlevniuk, Rees, p. 349–350]. 
It would be the historical precedent set by Lenin’s writings that would 
also be the cornerstone of attacks on members of the opposition with the 
accusation of employing tactics of “individual terror” against the Party, 
thus seeking to strike a blow on both a judicial (according to Soviet prac-
tices of law) and ideological level. This Marxist-Leninist characterisation 
of the enemy and its methods was something eventually codified in the pages 
of the Party’s official history: 
In a number of his writings during this period Lenin criticized the methods 
of political struggle employed by the principal Narodnik group, the “Narod-
naya Volya”, and later by the successors of the Narodniks, the Socialist-Revo-
lutionaries – especially the tactics of individual terrorism [sic] (individual’nogo 
terrora). Lenin considered these tactics harmful to the revolutionary move-
ment, for they substituted the struggle of individual heroes for the struggle 
of the masses. They signified a lack of confidence in the revolutionary move-
ment of the people [Short Course, p. 20].10
These were enemies, therefore, of not only the state and people of the 
Soviet Union, but of the very ideas of Marxism-Leninism held sacrosanct 
by the Party.
In fact, no better illustration of the monopolisation of this term exists 
than the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), 
commonly referred to as the Short Course. The number and consistency 
of presentation where references to “terror” appear in this work is remark-
able. However, this important feature of the text is often lost to English 
speaking audiences when the Russian term (terror) is misleadingly trans-
lated as the less evocative and more current term “terrorism”. 
The example of this text is particularly instructive given the recent pub-
lication of an annotated edition in English. Not only is the published text 
of the Short Course reproduced in translation, but adjustments and exci-
sions completed by Stalin and his team of editors survive in archived manu-
scripts and works in progress, and further clarify the ideological and his-
torical basis of this terminology [Brandenberger, Zelenov]. And yet, even 
in the example cited above, the preference remains to translate the Rus-
sian to “tactics of individual terrorism”, while the extensive quotation from 
Lenin’s writing on “terror” that was subsequently excised from the text be-
fore publication passes without comment [Ibid., p. 124].
10 The original Russian can be checked against the serialised edition of the Short Course 
published in [Правда, 1938, 9—19 сент.].
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It is important to stress that this terminology of terror was deeply em-
bedded in the ideology and political self-perception of the Bolsheviks. 
In the officially circulated final text, an important distinction remains; 
the term “terror” is only permitted direct association with Soviet rule once, 
when referencing the brief, “retaliatory”, “Red terror”, which sought retri-
bution for atrocities caused by the Whites during the Russian Civil War:
The Socialist-Revolutionaries, who had assassinated Comrades Uritsky 
and Volodarsky and had made a villainous attempt on the life of Lenin, were 
subjected to a Red terror in retaliation for their White terror against the Bol-
sheviks, and were completely routed in every important city in Central Russia 
[Short Course, p. 229].11
Conversely, the full text of the Short Course is carefully spun with 
examples of the Bolsheviks’ opponents – be it the misguided precursors 
of revolutionary Marxism (the Narodniks and members of “People’s Will”), 
the external forces of counter-revolution (White Guards and foreign in-
terventionists), or the internal threat of saboteurs, wreckers and political 
opposition – conspiring to “acts of terror” against the Party and the people 
of the Soviet Union [Short Course, p. 10, 200, 247, 292]. In the annotated 
edition, the adjustments to the text reveal instances when the self-conscious 
deployment of the specific language of terror took place, while stressing, 
too, that the targets of these methods were the Soviet leadership:
Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks, Anarchists and nationalists and so 
on, supported the Whiteguard generals and the invaders, and hatched coun-
ter-revolutionary plots within against the Soviet Republic on the imperialists’ 
orders and resorted to terrorism against Soviet leaders [sic] (organizuiut terror 
protiv sovetskikh deiatelei) [Brandenberger, Zelenov, p. 448].
What this cardinal text did was not unique; rather, it represents a con-
tinuation of the same strategy employed throughout the highpoint of So-
viet repressions in 1937–1938; a strategy at the heart of Stalin’s ideological 
worldview and persistent concern with the actions of enemies.
The condemnation of political opponents in the early 1930s and eventu-
al trial and execution of the Rightist-Trotskyite Bloc – though only sparsely 
dealt with in the latter stages of the Short Course – mirrors the same lan-
guage employed during the recorded (and publicly disseminated) tran-
scripts of the Moscow Show Trials [Short Course, p. 325–330, 346–348]. 
Despite Conquest’s numerous references to the dialogue of the prosecution 
in his history of the Trials, he fails to notice this fundamental connection 
between “terror” and its exploitation by the state. What is lost in English 
translation becomes abundantly clear in the Russian original:
11 For the original Russian, see: [Правда, 1938, 15 сент., с. 3].
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The accused RYKOV explained the motives for the adoption of terrorist 
methods by the “bloc of Rights and Trotskyites” as follows…
Perekhod <<pravo-trotskistkogo bloka>> k terroru obviniaemyi Rykov 
motiviroval sleduiushchim obrazom...
The accussed BUKHARIN, who in the course of the investigation admitted 
that the “bloc of Rights and Trotskyites” had already adopted terrorist methods 
in 1932, testified as follows:
“In 1932, too, during a meeting and conversation I had with PYATAKOV, 
I learnt from his of his meeting with L. SEDOV and his receipt through 
SEDOV of direct instructions from TROTSKY to adopt terrorist methods 
against leaders of the Party the State Government…”
Obviniaemyi Bukharin, priznavshii na sledstvii, chto na put’ terrora 
<<pravo-trotskistkii blok>> stal eshche v 1932 godu, pokazal sleduiushchee:
<<V tom zhe 1932 godu pri vstreche i razgovore s Piatakovym ia uznal... 
priamoi direktivny Trotskogo pereiti k terroru protiv rukovodstva partii 
i Sovetskoi vlasti...>> [People’s Commissariat of Justice of the USSR, p. 21].12
The examples above are not isolated cases. They are drawn from a single 
page of the published transcript that continues to be littered with references 
to “terror” (terrora; k terroru) in both the language of the prosecution and 
the confessions of the accused. This was no accident. With the stage care-
fully managed and both sides working to a stringently controlled script, 
it is essential that we understand the exact nature of the actors’ dialogue. 
Though “terroristic” (terroristicheskii) and other related derivations from 
the root appear, the blunt accusation of terror remained at the centre of the 
defendants’ supposed aims and methods. 
Such a public (and widely published) condemnation of these enemies 
of the people can be contrasted again with the careful presentation of the 
regime’s own repressive activity at the height of the mass operations, which 
exponentially extended the scope of Soviet repressions beyond those facing 
trial in Moscow. On 21 December 1937, with Pravda devoted to the cele-
brations of the twentieth anniversary of the NKVD, only a single, historical 
reference to “terror” is permitted throughout the whole six-page edition. 
An overt challenge is made to the bourgeois press’ “[cries] about red terror 
and the cruelty of the Bolsheviks” and is balanced against reports of wide-
spread celebrations of the continued efforts of the Soviet security services 
[Правда, 1937, 21 сент., с. 1].
The close incorporation of the institutions of press and propaganda 
into the regime’s strategy for managing the public face of Soviet power was 
12 According to Conquest this third trial “brought together publicly every type of op-
position, terror, sabotage, treachery and espionage, and turned them into branches of one 
single great conspiracy…The trial, which opened in the October Hall on 2 March 1938, had, 
indeed, taken over a year to prepare, but it was a production of far greater scope than the 
others” [Conquest, 2008, p. 341--343].
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essential to its continued success in deploying this terminology of terror. 
Lazar Kaganovich and Nikolai Yezhov’s role in organising the press’ treat-
ment of the Moscow Show Trials reveals the attention paid to domestic and 
foreign audiences alike. From Stalin’s correspondence, we learn that the 
leadership maintained strict vetting of reports on the trials, while “overall 
supervision is to be entrusted to Comrade Yezhov” – this even before his 
official promotion to the head of the NKVD. Distribution of reports on the 
trials was to be taken care of by TASS, “which is equipped for this” [Davies, 
Khlevniuk, Rees, p. 325]. Where mistakes were made, or pronouncements 
reconsidered, checks were in place to retract with immediate effect:
During the Yezhoshchina, the only news printed about the purges came 
from TASS. At the big trials only TASS and Pravda journalists were present. 
Sometimes TASS sends foreign news on the teletype and two hours later sends 
instructions to pull the news out.13
Kaganovich’s earlier “Machiavellianism” had clearly won out [Rees, 
2012, p. 25]. It was a political philosophy equally close to Stalin’s heart 
and ensured that the repressions of the 1930s (and beyond) were run 
on a strictly need to know basis [Service, 2004, p. 342–342; Rees, 2004]. 
This was clearly, by now, a regime that perceived the necessity of both vio-
lence and good public relations.
The War on Terror Abroad
In David Brandenberger’s assessment of the aftermath of 1937–1938, 
the period should be characterised as one of crisis within the propaganda 
machinery. The CPSU was forced, above all, to respond to the decima-
tion of the Soviet’s “useable past” in the wake of the mass repressions – 
a task that was by no means complete by the end of the 1930s [Branden-
berger, p. 251]. While in general I agree with this interpretation, before 
the onset of war in Finland, the regime remained supremely confident 
in its relationship to violence and the language and ideology fashioned 
from its recent past. Thus, in the absence of individual heroes, the Krem-
lin was never short of villains to exploit, condemning their crimes while 
exonerating itself. 
The strict control over access to information about the worst ex-
cesses of Soviet power gave the regime free reign to continue to exploit 
the terminology of terror for attacks upon domestic enemies and their 
rivals abroad too. A damning criticism of the abhorrent crimes of capi-
talist countries against their own people, particularly those under the 
sway of fascism, was channelled through the Communist International 
in April 1939: 
13 These comments come from a former journalist and party member with extensive 
experience of the Soviet press apparatus [Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System 
(HPSSS), Schedule B, vol. 6, case 606, 13].
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In the annals of the momentous victories of socialism, the people of the 
capitalist countries, languishing in the chains of slavery, fascist terror, and war, 
see the living proof of the invincible might of the working class…Boundless 
is the suffering imposed upon the working people of the capitalist countries 
[Degras, p. 435].
Despite the shift in relationship of Berlin and Moscow to one of close 
collaboration just four months later, the Party felt no reason to adapt this 
rhetorical strategy in the face of any subsequent changes in target. Pravda 
produced the same false cries of indignation during the Red Army’s divi-
sion and occupation of Poland with Nazi Germany in September 1939, jus-
tifying the invasion with its condemnation of the “bloody terror practiced 
by the Polish gentry” [Thompson, p. 392].
As outlined at the start of this essay, my previous research on the So-
viet-Finnish War of 1939–1940 has demonstrated how one can continue 
to trace the pedantic nature of Soviet propaganda and the effort taken 
to present the regime’s enemies in a recognisable and universal imagery 
of white guards and foreign interventionists during this period. Indeed, 
even prior to events on the Finnish front spiralling out of control of the 
leadership, past practice informed the Party’s public relations strategy, 
as diplomatic efforts failed to produce the territorial concessions pressed 
for by Moscow. In November 1939, there remained a mark of confidence 
in the tried and tested language of terror where the regime’s presentation 
of Finnish society was concerned [Spencer, 2018]. This was, of course, 
before Red Army forces crossed the border and learned the reality of the 
country’s universal resolve to resist Soviet power [Rentola]. 
*   *   *
Continuity in the recourse to repression of the population was a fun-
damental component of the Soviet state. Many of its methods – and, 
of course, its language – remained the same in the 1920s, 30s, and even 
outside its borders during the post-war reordering of the Soviet bloc 
by national communist parties loyal to Moscow [Stalinist Terror in East-
ern Europe]. This was possible thanks to a shared commitment to abso-
lute secrecy when carrying out any coercive activity, alongside a willing-
ness to censor all conflicting voices, be they in print or in person.
Contemporaneous and historiographical uses of “terror” therefore 
stand in striking juxtaposition: the former attributing it only to enemies 
of the state; the latter considering it an inherent and defining characteristic 
of Soviet power itself. Given this fundamental divergence on such a vital 
issue, it seems essential to alter our use and understanding of the terminol-
ogy of terror, if we are to understand either the mechanics and motiva-
tions of state repression, or indeed the public perceptions of what Stalinism 
as a way of life meant at the time.
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The regime was not motivated by a desire to openly terrorise the pop-
ulation and did not seek to aggrandise the excesses of the Soviet penal 
system. Suspected enemies were made to disappear without fanfare or 
witness, removed from the public eye in a most absolute act of censor-
ship [Conquest, 2008, p. 261]. Once excised, the regime was then acutely 
aware of the need to continue censoring information that might reveal 
the truth to the families and friends of victims [Khlevniuk, p. 329]. 
In this atmosphere, the unknown could still be a source of fear, of terror 
even, though without tangible knowledge of the exact motives and me-
chanics of state repression, it was less likely to incite explicit and collec-
tive resistance. After all, the Moscow Show Trials, the Short Course, and 
the persistent and pervasive propaganda of the state all emphasised that 
the real threat came from opposition at home and abroad. The familiar 
and omnipresent face of Stalin and the rest of the Party, by contrast, were 
responsible for protecting the population from this threat to their per-
son, property and way of life.14
However, as far as this author is aware, notwithstanding the occasional 
recognition of the unsuitability of the term within scholarship of the pe-
riod, this potential ‘red herring’ has detracted from the very real and tangi-
ble strategy deployed by the regime. A strategy aimed at either covering its 
own tracks, or publicly justifying the extreme methods by which it sought 
to defend against the threat of enemies. This is a genuine cause for concern 
given the length of time that research on the topic has continued, and the 
consistency with which this outdated and erroneous terminology has been 
applied. There is real need to consider whether the framing and labelling 
of the Stalinist repressions as “terror” actively obscured the contemporary 
reality and led historians to overlook sources that my own research has 
found in abundance.
Besides rejecting this terminology from a historiographical perspec-
tive, understanding the contemporaneous use of terror by the regime as 
a stable meaning for the enemy offers a long-term view of the Stalinist 
period. This paper has, thus, sought to echo the approach seen recently 
in Shearer’s study of Stalin’s fears of intervention and subversion of the 
state by those numerous enemies seen (and imagined) throughout his 
primacy [Shearer, 2018]. The response to that threat was consistently one 
of repressive force enacted against the Soviet people, but the escalation 
of that violence and justification of it in the eyes of the Party is another 
essential component of the Soviet example and requires an appreciation 
of the ideological and historical basis on which the leadership built their 
worldview.
14 Advances in the study of choice and judgement are worth acknowledging. So blind 
are we to influences upon our decisions that even the simple force of familiarity and other 
external primers – with very real parallels in the mechanics of any authoritarian state – are 
still under appreciated: “The evidence of priming studies suggests that reminding people 
of their mortality increases the appeal of authoritarian ideas, which may become reassuring 
in the context of the terror of death” [Kahneman, p. 56].
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